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LIBERTY-FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
LIBERTY UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT:
1942-1943
JOHN RAEBURN GREENt
A year ago an attempt was made to survey the status of the
fundamental rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights with respect
to their protection against State abridgment.' It was observed
that the struggle to obtain for these liberties constitutional pro-
tection against State abridgment, as well as against Federal
abridgment, had been almost continuous since the adoption of the
Constitution; that Madison had sought-unsuccessfully-to pro-
vide in the Bill of Rights such guaranties for freedom of speech
and of the press, for religious freedom, and for the right of trial
by jury in criminal cases ;2 that notwithstanding this failure the
explosive force of the concept that these fundamental rights and
liberties must somehow be safeguarded by the Bill of Rights
against State denial was so great as to keep the question almost
constantly before the Supreme Court from 1833 to 1913; that
with the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 firmer
pegs were found on which to hang the claim to constitutional
protection, the contention being made-again unsuccessfully, on
the whole-for some fifty years that these liberties were "privi-
leges or immunities," protected by that clause of the Amendment;
and that eventually, in 1925, Gitlow v. New York3 established
the protection for freedom of speech and of the press, as integral
parts of the "liberty" which the due process clause safeguards
against State deprivation.4
The inclusion in liberty, in 1937, of the right of peaceable
assembly,5 also guaranteed by the First Amendment, and the
t A.B., Westminster College, 1914; L.L.B., Harvard University, 1917.
Member of St. Louis Bar.
1. Green, Liberty Under the Fourteenth Amendment (1942) 27 WASH-
INOTON U. LAW QUARTERLY 497.
2. For an admirable discussion of this, see Warren, The New "Liberty"
under the Fourteenth Amendment (1926) 39 Harv. L. Rev. 431, 433-435.
8. (1925) 268 U. S. 652.
4. Originally "liberty" had meant simply freedom from physical re--
straint. The expansion to include these freedoms resulted from the earlier
expansion to include liberty of contract. See Green, supra note 1, at 505-514.
5. DeJonge v. Oregon (1937) 299 U. S. 353. See also Herndon v. Lowry
(1987) 301 U. S. 242; and Hague v. C. I. 0. (1939) 307 U. S. 496. With
respect to protection of the right to petition for a redress of grievances,
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Court's oddly slow progress toward the same result with respect
to religious freedom, which ultimately obtained protection in
1940,6 were discussed, as was also the incomplete development
of protection of the fundamental rights which the Bill of Rights
guarantees to the accused in a criminal prosecution, notably the
privilege against self-incrimination, guaranteed by the Fifth
Amendment, and the right to the aid of counsel, guaranteed by
the Sixth.7
The Court at its 1942 term, just closed, decided several cases
in this field which are not without interest, and one which is of
the highest importance. With regard to the effects of the new
liberty, it was observed a year ago that, since abridgment of
freedom of expression and of religious freedom was attempted
much more often by the States (including their municipalities,
counties, school boards, and courts) than by the Federal Govern-
ment, protection of these freedoms against State denial had im-
mediately vitalized the First Amendment into a safeguard of
great practical importance, giving it effect where it was needed
rather than where it was seldom required.8 The decisions of the
1942-1943 term confirm this conclusion. In the seventeen years
between 1925 and 1942 the Court had had presented to it no less
than thirty-two times the claim that State action had denied a
right guaranteed by the First Amendment, whereas in the same
period a similar claim appeared to have been made only three
exercised independently of any assembly, see Bridges v. California (1941)
314 U. S. 252, 277.
6. Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940) 310 U. S. 296.
7. See Green, supra note 1, at 529-535.
8. Green, supra note 1, at 535-536.
9. In only one of these three cases did the Court find a possible Federal
abridgment: National Labor Relations Board v. Virginia Electric & Power
Co. (1941) 314 U. S. 469. There an order of the National Labor Relations
Board was held to abridge the employer's freedom of speech with his em-
ployees, unless it was supported by evidence of related coercion. When this
case again reached the Court at the 1942 term, the Court held that the
Board's new findings and conclusions were "not subject to the infirmities
of the original ones," and that the employer's bulletin and speeches had
been "considered not in isolation but as part of a pattern of events adding
up to the conclusion of domination and interference." Virginia Electric &
Power Co. v. National Labor Relations Board (1943) 63 S. Ct. 832. The
Court's earlier decision appears to have caused the Board to modify its prac-
tice in this matter. See In re Essex Rubber Co. (1943) NLRB Case No.
C-3526, 11 U. S. Law Week 1199, 2887. A similar question may be con-
sidered by the Court at its 1943 term. Trojan Powder Co. v. National Labor
Relations Board (1943) 135 F. (2d) 337 (certiorari applied for July 27,
1943).
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times9 with respect to Federal action. The Court's opinions at
the term just closed deal with nine claims of State denial of
these liberties, but with only two claims of Federal denial. 10
The 1925-1943 totals are therefore forty-one claims of State
abridgment, and five of Federal."
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND OF THE PRESS
The development of freedom of speech and of the press, follow-
ing their inclusion in liberty in 1925, had been so rapid that in
1941 it was possible for Mr. Justice Frankfurter to say that "in
a series of opinions as uncompromising as any in its history, this
Court has settled that the fullest opportunities for free discus-
sion are 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, and thus,
through the Fourteenth Amendment,' protected against at-
tempted invasion by the States."'1 2 The earlier cases had dealt
with utterances of an essentially political nature, but the Court,
quickly moving beyond these limits, had made it clear that the
10. The cases of State abridgment are the following: Largent v. Texas
(1943) 68 S. Ct. 667; Jamison v. Texas (1943) 63 S. Ct. 669; Murdock v.
Pennsylvania (1943) 63 S. Ct. 870; Douglas v. Jeannette (1943) 63 S. Ct.
877; Martin v. Struthers (1943) 63 S. Ct. 862; West Virginia State Board
of Education v. Barnette (1943) 63 S. Ct. 1178; and Taylor v. Mississippi
(1943) 63 S. Ct. 1200 (embracing three independent cases). All of these
are discussed in the text. Cf. Tileston v. Ullman (1943) 63 S. Ct. 493, where
a physician claimed that a Connecticut statute prohibting the giving of pro-
fessional advice concerning contraceptives violated the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, not because it deprived him of freedom of speech, but because it
endangered the lives of his patients.
The two cases in which the claim of Federal abridgment was made were
National Broadcasting Co. v. United States (1943) 63 S. Ct. 997 (Federal
Communications Commission's network broadcasting regulations held not to
abridge freedom of speech) and Busey v. District of Columbia (1943) 63
S. Ct. 1277, remanding the conviction of Jehovah's Witnesses for selling
religious magazines without paying the license tax required by a District
of Columbia statute. This case, although a Federal abridgment, involved
what was essentially a municipal ordinance.
In all computations memoranda cases have been excluded.
All of the cases of State abridgment during the term were the result of
challenges of statutes or ordinances by Jehovah's Witnesses. This mass
production of litigation by a single sect may tend to distort the statistics,
but the wide geographical distribution of these cases should not be over-
looked. There was no such predominance of Jehovah's Witnesses prior to
the 1942 term, although in recent years where had been an increasing per-
centage of cases involving their activities.
11. In thirty-one of the forty-one State cases, which commence with
Gitlow v. New York (1925) 268 U. S. 652, the Court sustained the claim,
and one of the remaining ten has since been overruled. In two of the five
Federal cases the claim was sustained, but see notes 9 and 10, supra, as
to these.
12. Bridges v. California (1941) 314 U. S. 252, 281-282.
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scope of the constitutional guaranty was general, and in no way
dependent upon the subject of the utterance.3 It seemed, until
1942, that consideration of the status of these freedoms might
well be confined to the clear and present danger test.
However, in Valentine v. Chrestensen,4 in 1942, a unanimous
court, through Mr. Justice Roberts, holding that a New York
ordinance prohibiting the distribution of advertising matter on
the streets was valid, said that, while the streets were "proper
places for the exercise of the freedom of communicating infor-
mation and disseminating opinion," and this privilege might
not be unduly burdened or prescribed, the Court was "equally
clear that the Constitution imposes no such restraint on govern-
ment as respects purely commercial advertising." The ordinance
may very well have been valid, but it is another thing to say
that "commercial advertising" is (presumably because tainted by
the profit motive of the advertiser) wholly outside the protection
of the First Amendment. After all, these freedoms are the right
of the listener as well as of the speaker, of the reader as well
as of the publisher; and there are other fundamental reasons why
the proposition cannot be maintained.15
The Court's four references, 6 at its 1942 term, to this decision
are hardly enlightening, although they show at least an avoid-
ance of the suggestion that commercial advertising is not within
the shield of the First Amendment. In addition, Mr. Justice
Jackson remarked in Murdock v. PennsylvaniW7 that in his view
"the First Amendment assures the broadest tolerable exercise
of free speech, free press, and free assembly, not merely for
religious purposes, but for political, economic, scientific, news or
informational ends as well." Although this is (unfortunately, I
think) phrased in terms of areas, the areas are broad enough to
make the exclusion of commercial advertising at least difficult.
13. See Near v. Minnesota (1931) 283 U. S. 697; Grosjean v. American
Press Co. (1936) 297 U. S. 233; Lovell v. Griffin (1938) 303 U. S. 444;
Schneider v. Irvington (1939) 308 U. S. 147.
14. (1942) 316 U. S. 52, 54.
15. See Green, supra note 1, at 558-559. The opinion may have been
influenced by loose language used in some of the picketing cases, commenc-
ing with Thornhill v. Alabama (1940) 310 U. S. 88, 102, regarding an
"area of free discussion that is guaranteed by the Constitution."
16. By Mr. Justice Black in Jamison v. Texas (1943) 63 S. Ct. 669, 87
L. ed. 629; by Mr. Justice Douglas in Murdock v. Pennsylvania (1943)
63 S. Ct. 870, 87 L. ed. 827; by Mr. Justice Jackson in Murdock v. Penn-
sylvania (1943) 63 S. Ct. 882; and by Mr. Justice Black in Martin v.
Struthers (1943) 63 S. Ct. 862, 87 L. ed. 861.
17. (1943) 63 S. Ct. 882, 888.
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With one exception, all of the Jehovah's Witnesses cases at the
1942 term involved religious freedom as well as freedom of ex-
pression. While some of these may be of equal importance to
both freedoms, they are considered below under freedom of re-
ligion. The exception is Taylor v. Mississippi,8 where the Court,
through Mr. Justice Roberts, held that freedom of speech and
of the press were abridged by a Mississippi statute which pro-
hibited, amongst other things, the dissemination, orally, by phon-
ograph, or by the distribution of literature, of teaching "designed
and calculated" to encourage disloyalty, and also action or speech
which "reasonably tends to create an attitude of stubborn refusal
to salute, honor or respect the flag." Convictions for advocating
refusal to salute the flag were reversed because, the Court said,
if the Fourteenth Amendment bans enforcement of the school
regulation, 19 a fortiori it prohibits punishment for advocating
non-compliance on religious grounds; while the convictions for
utterance calculated to encourage disloyalty failed to meet the
clear and present danger test.
THE FREE ExERCISE OF RELIGION
In Largent v. Texas20 the Court, through Mr. Justice Reed,
reversed the conviction of one of Jehovah's Witnesses, under a
municipal ordinance which required a permit, issuable in the
Mayor's discretion, for the sale of books in the residential por-
tion of the city. The Court said that this was "administrative
censorship in an extreme form," and abridged alike "the freedom
of religion, of the press and of speech guaranteed by the Four-
teenth Amendment." On the same day, in Jamison v. Texas,21
the Court, through Mr. Justice Black, held that a Dallas ordi-
nance prohibiting the distribution of handbills on the streets was,
when applied to one of Jehovah's Witnesses, a denial of freedom
of the press and of religious freedom. There was no dissent in
either case.22 With these decisions, Cantwell v. Connecticut2a
18. (1943) 63 S. Ct. 1200.
19. W. Va. Board of Educ. v. Barnette (1943) 63 S. Ct. 1178, 87 L. Ed.
1171, discussed below.
20. (1943) 63 S. Ct. 667, 87 L. ed. 627.
21. (1943) 63 S. Ct. 669, 87 L. ed. 629.
22. Both decisions were rested on the earlier cases: Lovell v. Griffin
(1988) 303 U. S. 444; Schneider v. Irvington (1939) 308 U. S. 147; and
Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940) 310 U. S. 296. See Green, supra note 1, at
518-519, for discussion of these.
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ceased to be the only instance in which the Court had protected
religious freedom.
This was the prelude to the issue which, on the last day of
the 1941 term, had divided the Court. A 5 to 4 majority had up-
held, in Jones v. Opelika, 24 the convictions of Jehovah's Wit-
nesses for selling religious literature in violation of three munici-
pal ordinances, all of which imposed flat license fees, and one
of which also provided discretionary power to revoke the license.
At the 1942 term one of the majority, Mr. Justice Byrnes, re-
signed, and Mr. Justice Rutledge took his place .2 Thereafter the
Court granted rehearing,26 the case was reargued, the earlier
judgment was vacated, and the convictions reversed.2T This re-
sult was due simply to the substitution of Mr. Justice Rutledge
for Mr. Justice Byrnes; no member of the Court changed his
mind.
The case was unfortunately neither heard nor decided alone;
it was commingled with a number of other cases, and the opin-
ions in this group (ten in all) suffer by reason of this. In the
Opelika case were already embraced three ordinances, by no
means identical in their requirements ;28 now the Court merged
with these eight new cases where Jehovah's Witnesses had been
convicted of selling religious literature in violation of an ordi-
nance of Jeannette, Pennsylvania (Murdock v. Pennsylvania2 ),
and by a series of overlapping opinions decided simultaneously
Douglas v. Jeannette, ° a suit to enjoin prosecutions under this
ordinance, and Martin v. Struthers,31 a conviction under an ordi-
nance of Struthers, Ohio, which made it unlawful "for any per-
son distributing handbills, circulars or other advertisements to
ring the doorbell, sound the door knocker or otherwise summon"
23. (1940) 310 U. S. 296.
24. (1942) 316 U. S. 584, discussed in Green, supra note 1, at 524-527.
25. Shortly before Jones v. Opelika, Mr. Justice Rutledge, then a judge
of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, had
expressed [in a dissenting opinion in Busey v. District of Columbia (1942)
129 F. (2d) 24] the view which the Opelika minority subsequently had
taken.
26. Jones v. Opelika (1943) 63 S. Ct. 658, 37 L. ed. 515. See Fuchs, The
Judicial Art of Wiley B. Rutledge, 28 WASHINGTON U. LAW QUARTERLY
(1943) 115, 142-144.
27. (1943) 63 S. Ct. 890, 87 L. ed. 515.
28. See Green, supra note 1, at 524 note.
29. (1943) 63 S. Ct. 870, 87 L. ed. 827.
30. (1943) 63 S. Ct. 877, 87 L. ed. 855.
31. (1943) 63 S. Ct. 862, 87 L. ed. 861.
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the inmate to the door to receive the circulars. The second Jones
v. Opelika12 is a short per curiam memorandum, reversing the
convictions for the reasons stated in the dissenting opinions at
the previous term, and in the Murdock case.
In the Murdock case3 the Court held that the flat license tax
imposed by the ordinance was in substance a tax laid specifically
on the free exercise of religion and on the exercise of the free-
doms of speech and of the press, and hence violated the Four-
tenth Amendment. Mr. Justice Douglas (speaking for the four
dissenters in the first Opelika case, and for Mr. Justice Rutledge)
said that "the hand distribution of religious tracts is an age-old
form of missionary evangelism ... It is more than preaching;
it is more than a distribution of religious literature. It is a com-
bination of both. . . . It has the same claim to protection as
the more orthodox and conventional exercises of religion." The
solicitation of funds or the invitation to purchase books which
accompanied this did not "transform evangelism into a commer-
cial enterprise. If it did the passing of the collection plate in
church would make the church service a commercial project."
"It is one thing," he said, "to impose a tax on the income or
property of a preacher. It is quite another thing to exact a tax
from him for the privilege of delivering a sermon." As. Mr.
Chief Justice Stone had done in the first Opelika case, Mr. Justice
Douglas argued that a fiat license tax, fixed in amount and un-
related to the scope of the activities or the revenue derived there-
from, restrains in advance "those constitutional liberties of press
and religion and inevitably tends to suppress their exercise,"
having indeed as potent a destructive influence "as the power of
censorship which this Court has repeatedly struck down." He
disposed of the "non-discriminating" point (so often made in
these cases), by remarking that "a license tax certainly does not
acquire constitutional validity because it classifies the privileges
protected by the First Amendment along with the wares and
merchandise of peddlers and treats them all alike ... Freedom
of speech, freedom of press, freedom of religion are in a pre-
ferred position." The State has not "given something for which
it can ask a return," Mr. Justice Douglas continued, for these
82. (1948) 63 S. Ct. 890, 87 L. ed. 515.
83. Flat license fees of $1.50 for one day, $7.00 for one week, $12.00 for
two weeks, and $20.00 for three weeks.
Washington University Open Scholarship
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rights, guaranteed by the First Amendment, exist "apart from
state authority." And the ordinances were not registration ordi-
nances, nor was the fee "a nominal one, imposed as a regulatory
measure and calculated to defray the expense of protecting...
against the abuses of solicitors."
While this opinion followed, in the main, the dissenting opin-
ions in the earlier case, it omitted the point there made that the
license fees were, in relation to the revenues derivable from
these sales, so heavy as to be prohibitive. In striking down the
ordinance, it thus goes further. Justices Reed and Frankfurter,
in separate dissenting opinions, 34 emphasized that there was no
evidence that the license fees were so excessive as to be pro-
hibitory, and that this point had been expressly disclaimed by
counsel, whose contention was "that no tax, no matter how
trifling, can constitutionally be laid upon the activity of dis-
tributing religious literature, regardless of the actual effect of
the tax." This, Mr. Justice Frankfurter said, "is the only ques-
tion presented to us." Mr. Justice Reed argued that "the rites
protected by the First Amendment are in essence spiritual-
prayer, mass, sermons, sacrament-not sales of religious goods"
(which he considered that this method of distribution amounted
to) ; that the First Amendment was not intended to exempt "the
distribution of religious literature" from "non-discriminatory,
non-excessive taxation"; and that the possibility that the tax
might "be used readily to restrict the dissemination of ideas"
did not make it unconstitutional, if it was in fact not so used.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter considered that there was "no consti-
tutional difference between a so-called regulatory fee and an
imposition for purposes of revenue," and that a tax could not
"be invalidated merely because it falls upon activities which con-
stitute an exercise of a constitutional right." Both he and Mr.
Justice Reed made the point which Mr. Justice Jackson (in his
separate dissent) also made: that the State has a right to make
this activity pay its way, to demand an amount not exceeding
"the cost to the community of policing this activity.135
34. Justices Roberts, Frankfurter and Jackson joined in Mr. Justice
Reed's dissent. Mr. Justice Jackson joined in Mr. Justice Frankfurter's,
and also dissented in a separate opinion (joined in by Mr. Justice Frank-
furter) which applied to the Jeannette and Struthers cases also. For a
sorting out of the opinions, see The New Leaflet Decisions (1943) 3
Lawyers Guild Review 43; Dilliard, About Face to Freedom (1943) 108
New Republic 693.
35. This seems inconsistent with another ground of dissent. All three
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol28/iss4/1
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If the questions here were reduced to two: (1) Was this an
"exercise of religion"? (2) If it was, can it be taxed at all?-
the answers would not be too difficult. The minority gave a flat
"No" to the first of these questions. "Nor do we think it can be
said, properly, that these sales of religious books are religious
exercises," Mr. Justice Reed observes. The disagreement here
seems to result, ultimately, from a differing degree of perception
of the compulsion which a religious belief, genuinely held, may
place upon the believer. Submission to the evangelistic command
has in the past been regarded as an exercise of religion, inexo-
rably compelled by conscience, to an extent sufficient to influence
history more profoundly than any other force. These cases show
that it is still so regarded by Jehovah's Witnesses, for, as Mr.
Justice Douglas says, "the integrity of this conduct or behavior
as a religious practice has not been challenged," and there is no
"question as to the sincerity of petitioners in their religious be-
liefs and practices, however misguided they may be thought to
be." Unless mankind has greatly changed, this sect will be by
no means the last to act under a similar compulsion. Because of
their inadequate appreciation of this, the dissenting opinions
seem unrealistic."1
The second question is, of course, a much more important one.
The majority held that this tax on the distribution of religious
literature was "a restraint on the free exercise of religion"; and
then went further, holding that it was also "an abridgment of
freedom of press." The holding might perhaps better have been
limited to the exercise of religion, for its extension to freedom
of the press lays it open to a devastating attack by Mr. Justice
Reed.37 One who accepts the view that an exercise of religion
dissenting opinions stress that the literature was sold, implying quite
plainly that a flat license tax upon its free distribution would be invalid.
"Street hawkers make demands upon municipalities that involve the ex-
penditures of dollars and cents, whether they hawk printed matter or
other things," Mr. Justice Frankfurter remarks; but are their demands
any the less if the printed matter is given away instead of sold?
86. They seem unrealistic also in failing to take into account the eco-
nomic necessity which compels a new denomination, if it is to survive, to
couple with its evangelistic activities a solicitation of contributions or pur-
chase of literature. As Mr. Justice Douglas observed, the First Amendment
freedoms "are available to all, not merely to those who can pay their own
way."
87. He cites Giragi v. Moore (1937) 301 U. S. 670 and quotes the Court's
reservation in Grosjean v. American Press (1936) 297 U. S. 233, 250: "It
is not intended by anything we have said to suggest that the owners of
1948]
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may in no wise be taxed may still hesitate to extend equal im-
munity to the press-perhaps because of the difference in the
language of the First Amendment (only "freedom of the press"
is protected, not its "exercise"), perhaps because the press is,
more often than not, an enterprise undertaken for profit, sup-
ported by its "commercial" activities instead of by benevolent
contributions, perhaps because, of the two freedoms, religion is
at once the frailer and the deeper, and therefore more is gained
by giving it tax exemption.38 The two freedoms have marched
side by side, but, when a choice had to be made, the framers
of the First Amendment placed religious freedom first. The
full implications of the holding with respect to freedom of
the press have perhaps not been realized, even by the dissent-
ing justices. Unless promptly limited or qualified, this is an
invitation to challenges of the validity of many taxes now levied
by the Federal Government as well as by municipalities-for
only one example, taxes now levied on motion pictures and
admissions to them. To exempt the distribution of religious liter-
ature from taxation, because it is religious, is inexpensive to
government; but the economic result of exempting the press from
all taxation of its circulation activities would be far-reaching.
Even with respect to religious freedom, in Murdock v. Penn-
sylvania, the new majority has now gone so far that it is likely
at least to pause before going further. But Jehovah's Witnesses
can hardly have made their last appearance in the Court, for it
is of record that their beliefs include one (convenient, but still
doubtless genuine), that application for any license, even a free
one, is forbidden by Jehovah's commandment. 9 It is therefore
not to be supposed that they will regard the Murdock decision
as any more than an intermediate skirmish in a long campaign.
It may be expected that they will challenge, as opportunities
arise, even the regulatory system of licensing or registration,
newspapers are immune from any of the ordinary forms of taxation for
support of the Government."
Mr. Justice Reed might also have quoted, from Associated Press v. Na-
tional Labor Relations Board (1937) 301 U. S. 103, 132-133: "The pub-
lisher of a newspaper has no special immunity from the application of
general laws... Like others, he must pay equitable and non-discriminatory
taxes on his business."
38. This doubtless prompts the reduced rates accorded ministers for
many things (sanctioned, in the case of interstate transportation, by the
Federal Government).
39. Lovell v. Griffin (1938) 303 U. S. 444.
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and the nominal fee therefor, which the implications of Mr. Jus-
tice Douglas' opinion would allow.
In Douglas v. Jeannette"0 a unanimous court, in an opinion by
Mr. Chief Justice Stone, refused to enjoin criminal prosecutions
under the Jeannette ordinance which the Murdock decision had
invalidated, saying the Court could not assume that the City
would "not acquiesce in the decision of this Court holding the
challenged ordinance unconstitutional as applied to petitioners."14 1
In Martin -v. Struthers,42 a 6 to 3 decision, the Court, through
Mr. Justice Black, reversed the conviction of one of Jehovah's
Witnesses for, in the distribution of their literature, going to the
homes of strangers'4 knocking on doors and ringing doorbells,
in violation of an ordinance which prohibited knocking and door-
bell ringing in the distribution of "handbills, circulars or other
advertisements." Saying that the ordinance substituted the judg-
ment of the community for that of the individual householder,
that it punished the distributer "even though the recipient of the
literature was in fact glad to receive it," that door to door dis-
tribution was a traditional method for the dissemination of ideas,
of widespread use, and that its dangers might "easily be con-
trolled by traditional legal methods" (punishment for trespass
after being warned by the householder by appropriate indica-
tion), as well as by "identification devices" preventing "abuse of
the privilege by criminals posing as canvassers," the Court held
that the ordinance was an invasion of freedom of speech and of
the press. Mr. Justice Murphy, in a concurring opinion joined in
by Justices Douglas and Rutledge, regarded it also as an abridg-
ment of the free exercise of religion (and, indeed, it is difficult to
see why Mr. Justice Black omitted this). Mr. Justice Frank-
furter, remarking that "the greatest leeway must be given to the
legislative judgment," nevertheless concurred (in a separate
opinion) because the ordinance was capable of being construed as
"an invidious discrimination against the distributors of what is
politely called literature," and therefore an unjustifiable prohibi-
40. (1948) 63 S. Ct. 877, 87 L. ed. 855.
41. Also, as a result of the Murdock and Opelika decisions, the Court
remanded Busey v. District of Columbia (1943) 63 S. Ct. 87 L. ed. 1199(see note 25, supra).
42. (1943) 63 S. Ct. 862, 87 L. ed. 861.
43. The ordinance was not so narrowly drawn. It would in terms have
applied to ringing the doorbell (for this purpose) at the home of a friend
or relative.
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tion of freedom of utterance. Mr. Justice Reed, considering that
the ordinance was not discriminatory, dissented, Justices Roberts
and Jackson joining in his dissent. Mr. Justice Jackson, in a
separate dissenting opinion of great vigor, dealt with this whole
group of cases, analysing "the broad plan of campaign" of
Jehovah's Witnesses, the national structure of the sect, and the
intolerant and offensive character of its literature,4" as well as
the activities disclosed by the records. "Such is the activity,"
he said, "which it is claimed no public authority can either regu-
late or tax. This claim is substantially, if not quite, sustained
today." The Struthers ordinance, he continued, left the dis-
tributer "free to make the distribution if he left the householder
undisturbed, to take it in his own time," but "the Court says
that the City has not even this much leeway in ordering its
affairs, however complicated they may be as the result of round-
the-clock industrial activity." He then said: "This Court is for-
ever adding new stories to the temples of constitutional law, and
the temples have a way of collapsing when one story too many
is added. So it was with liberty of contract, which was dis-
credited by being overdone. The Court is adding a new privilege
to override the rights of others to what has before been re-
garded as religious liberty."
The warning is not to be ignored, but it seems inapplicable
here. The case, indeed, seems one which should not have given
the Court much trouble, for the existence of a non-abridging
means of protecting the householder should be sufficient to in-
validate an abridging means.45 If the non-abridging methods,
to which Mr. Justice Black referred, are not too burdensome to
the householder, that should be sufficient to justify the decision,
even aside from the "discriminatory" point. The growth of
Jehovah's Witnesses, notwithstanding their odd doctrines, has
been accomplished chiefly by use of these methods of proselyting.
Their success proves that there are persons who are receptive
to these beliefs, however surprising that may be. It should not
be necessary for the Court to say that these freedoms extend to
all, not simply to the intelligent or the inoffensive.
44. For a history of the sect and description of its beliefs, see Heller,
A Turning Point for Religious Liberty (1943) 29 Va. L. Rev. 440; Mulder
and Comisky, Jehovah's Witnesses Mold Constitutional Law (1942) 2 Bill
of Rights Review 262.
45. Cf. Schneider v. Irvington (1939) 308 U. S. 147, 162, 164.
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THE FLAG SALUTE DECISION
In 1940 the Court held in Minersville School District v.
Gobitis"6 that a school board regulation requiring all children to
participate in saluting the flag and in reciting a pledge of allegi-
ance, was not a deprivation of religious liberty, in the case of
children (belonging to Jehovah's Witnesses) who, as the Court
said, refused to participate, in the conscientious belief that this
was forbidden by command of scripture. The solitary dissenter
from this holding was the present Chief Justice. Seldom has
any decision of the Court been so generally and so sharply
criticized.47 There was little to balance against abridgment of
the freedom, for it seemed evident that, while there are many
ways to teach loyalty and patriotism, compelling children to vio-
late their consciences by engaging in a salute and a pledge of
allegiance is hardly one of them. In spite of the fact that eight
members of the Court had concurred in the holding, this con-
sideration made it seem probable, from the beginning, that the
dissent of Mr. Chief Justice Stone must eventually prevail.
At the 1941 term, Justices Black, Douglas and Murphy, dis-
senting in Jones v. Opelika,"8 said that "since we joined in the
opinion in the Gobitis case, we think this is an appropriate occa-
sion to state that we now believe that it was also wrongly de-
cided." Four months later, in Barnette v. State Board of Edu-
cation,49 a three-judge court in the Southern District of West
Virginia, remarked, through Circuit Judge Parker, that "the
developments with respect to the Gobitis case... are such that
we do not feel that it is incumbent upon us to accept it as bind-
ing authority,"5 and enjoined the State Board of Education from
46. (1940) 810 U. S. 586, discussed in Green, supra note 1, at 519-523.
47. The brief filed by the Bill of Rights Committee of the American BarAssociation in the Barnette case, infra, collected twenty-five discussions of
the decision in legal periodicals, of which twenty were critical, two sup-ported it, and three took no position. An admirable treatment is that ofMr. Thomas Reed Powell, Conscience and The Constitution, in (1941)Hutchinson, Democracy and National Unity, 18-31. For discerning com-
ment, reluctantly approving the reasoning, but disliking the result, seeLerner, The Mind and Faith of Justice Holmes (1943) 319-320.
48. (1942) 816 U. S. 584, 623-624.
49. (1942) 47 F. Supp. 251. For comment, see (1943) 43 Col. L. Rev.184; (1943) 27 Minn. L. Rev. 471.
50. The court said that of the seven justices still members of the Su-
preme Court who had participated in that decision, four had now "givenpublic expression to the view that it is unsound." (Mr. Chief Justice
Hughes and Mr. Justice McReynolds had retired in 1941.)
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enforcing, against children having conscientious scruples,5' a
regulation requiring a flag salute and a pledge of allegiance,
holding that such enforcement was "violative of religious lib-
erty." The court said that this freedom, "like the right of free
speech," could not be abridged "unless its exercise presents a
clear and present danger to the community."5 2
In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,63 a
decision of the highest importance, the Court affirmed this decree
on appeal2 Mr. Justice Jackson, for the majority of six," after
remarking that the freedom asserted brought no collision with
rights asserted by any other individual, "the sole conflict" being
"between authority and rights of the individual," observed that
"the compulsory flag salute and pledge requires affirmation of a
belief and an attitude of mind," and that "It is now a common-
place that censorship or suppression of expression of opinion is
tolerated by our Constitution only when the expression presents
a clear and present danger of action of a kind the State is em-
powered to prevent and punish. He suggested that "involuntary
affirmation could be commanded only on even more immediate
and urgent grounds than silence."' 8 The Gobitis decision, he
continued, "assumed, as did the argument in that case and this,
that power exists in the State to impose the flag salute discipline
upon school children in general. The Court only examined and
51. The suit was brought by members of Jehovah's Witnesses.
52. It cited Herndon v. Lowry (1937) 301 U. S. 242, as authority. It
added that "if speech tending to the overthrow of the Government but not
constituting a clear and present danger may not be forbidden because of
the guaranty of free speech, it is difficult to see how it can be held that
conscientious scruples against giving a flag salute must give way to an
educational policy having only indirect relation, at most, to the public
safety."
53. (1943) 63 S. Ct. 1178, 87 L. ed. 1171. For an excellent analysis, see
Powell, The Flag Salute Case (1943) 109 New Republic 16.
54. Briefs in support of the decree were filed by the Bill of Rights Com-
mittee of the American Bar Association, and the American Civil Liberties
Union, as amici curiae. In the oral argument, counsel for appellees stated
that the result of the Gobitis decision had been "civil war against Jehovah's
Witnesses," including beatings, wholesale expulsions, and other forms of
persecution. More than 20,000 children, he said, had been expelled from
school in the less than three years since the decision. See 11 U. S. Law
Week 3279.
55. He and Mr. Justice Rutiedge were the only justices who had not
participated in the Gobitis decision.
56. For consideration of the "liberty of silence" in Prudential Insurance
Co. v. Cheek (1922) 259 U. S. 530 (involving the Missouri service letter
statute, now R. S. Mo. 1939 §5064), and in the Gobitis case, see Green,
supra note 1, at 512 n. and at 522.
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rejected a claim based on religious beliefs of immunity from
an unquestioned general rule." But the question now examined
is "whether such a ceremony so touching matters of opinion
and political attitude may be imposed upon the individual by
official authority." "Freedom of speech and of press, of assem-
bly, and of worship," Mr. Justice Jackson said, may not be
infringed simply because a legislature has a "rational basis" for
infringing them; "they are susceptible of restriction only to pre-
vent grave and immediate danger to interests which the state
may lawfully protect." But here the refusal to salute was rela-
tively "harmless to others or to the State." "No official," he
added, can "force citizens to confess by word or act their faith"
in matters of opinion. Overruling the Gobitis decision, the Court
held that the regulation was wholly void. As in the religious
literature cases discussed above, the Court now goes further than
the earlier dissent.
Justices Black and Douglas, concurring "substantially," con-
fined themselves to the ground of religious freedom; but Mr.
Justice Murphy, in his separate concurrence, added to this the
"freedom of silence" which is the basis of Mr. Justice Jackson's
opinion. Justices Roberts and Reed adhered "to the views ex-
pressed by the Court" in the Gobitis case, without amplifying
this.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting separately, reduces the
issues to the ultimate one, and carries Mr. Justice Holmes'
philosophy of judicial laissez faire57 to its farthest point. The
opinion is a broader and perhaps a more profound statement of
the doctrine than any ever made by Mr. Justice Holmes; and
it is much more than a restatement of the position which Mr.
Justice Frankfurter took in the Gobitis case. Quoting the pres-
ent Chief Justice's admonition regarding judicial self-restraint,5
he said that "The Constitution does not give us greater veto
power when dealing with one phase of 'liberty' than with an-
other," and argued that "so far as the scope of judicial power
is concerned," the right not to have property taken without just
compensation has an equal claim with the First Amendment
freedoms; for "all the provisions of the first ten Amendments are
57. I am indebted for this term to Lerner, op. cit. supra, note 47, at 127-
128.
58. In United States v. Butler (1936) 297 U. S. 1, 79: "The only check
upon our own exercise of power is our own sense of self-restraint."
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'specific prohibitions,'" and each "in so far as embraced within
the Fourteenth Amendment, must be equally respected." Even
though legislation relates to civil liberties, "our duty of defer-
ence" to the legislature "is not less relevant or less exacting."
He considered that the Court's "only and very narrow function"
in dealing with legislation, "is to determine whether, within the
broad grant of authority vested in legislatures, they have exer-
cised a judgment for which reasonable justification can be of-
fered." Even this much prevents "the free play of the demo-
cratic process." He thought the essence of the religious free-
dom guaranteed by the Constitution to be simply: "no religion
shall either, receive the state's support or incur its hostility";
the individual conscience "cannot restrict community action...
in matters of community concern, so long as the action is not
asserted in a discriminatory way . . ." The flag salute require-
ment he regarded as an attempt to reach a "legitimate legisla-
tive end, . . . the promotion of good citizenship"; and he could
not "deny that reasonable legislators" could have enacted it.
Therefore he thought that it must be sustained.59
The case does indeed reach "ultimate questions of judicial
power and its relation to our scheme of government," as Mr.
Justice Frankfurter says. It is unfortunate that there is so
little direct clash in the judicial debate; as Mr. Justice Jack-
son's opinion was pointed largely to the majority opinion in the
Gobitis case, so Mr. Justice Frankfurter was replying to the
dissent there. In the meantime both sides have advanced their
positions. There can be no doubt that Mr. Justice Holmes' "judi-
59. The doctrine becomes with him one of "reasonable doubt": "We may
deem it a foolish measure, but the point is that this Court is not the organ
of government to resolve doubts as to whether it will fulfil its purpose.
Only if there be no doubt that any reasonable mind could entertain can we
deny to the states the right to resolve doubts their way and not ours."
While this was the chief, it was not the only, ground of dissent. A year
ago it was suggested that if the Gobitis decision was to be supported at all,
this might better be done upon the ground that, since under Pierce v.
Society of Sisters (1925) 268 U. S. 510, attendance at public schools could
not be compelled, children might avoid the flag salute requirement by going
elsewhere; although this was, of course, open to the answer that it was not
possible in actual fact for them to obtain equivalent education elsewhere
(Green, supra note 1, at 522). Mr. Justice Jackson having incautiously
said that "in the present case attendance is not optional," Mr. Justice
Frankfurter replied that West Virginia does not compel attendance at its
public schools because it cannot. He rightly rejected the distinction (which
the majority opinion attempted to make on this ground) between this case
and Hamilton v. University of California (1934) 293 U. S. 245.
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cial tolerance" and "judicial restraint" with respect to State
legislation 0 have profoundly influenced every member of the
Court."1 But most of them have realized that these principles
had a limited field of application. So, indeed, they had with Mr.
Justice Holmes. He developed them (chiefly though not entirely)
in dissents from decisions which struck down social legislation
as violative of liberty of contract 62 -that ironic liberty which
from the first he sought to limit. The Fourteenth Amendment
did not embody "our economic or moral beliefs," nor should it
be used "beyond the absolute compulsion of its words" to pre-
vent the making of social or economic experiments by the States,
he said over and over again. The legislation to which the precept
is here applied is not experimental, but counter-experimental: it
is Jehovah's Witnesses who are departing from the established
order, not West Virginia. And, while "the Fourteenth Amend-
ment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's 'Social Statics,'" it
does enact freedom of speech and the free exercise of religion.63
There is a difference between permitting the legislature to ex-
periment despite the farthest reaches of a highly imaginative
liberty of contract, and allowing it to deny the fundamental
rights explicitly guaranteed by the First Amendment. For Mr.
Justice Holmes, judicial laissez faire had its limits, even nar-
rower than need here be considered, for he struck down (with-
out a hint of deference to the legislature) as a deprivation of
property rights, a Pennsylvania statute which I think the pres-
ent Court, if they considered it on first impression, might sustain
as desirable social legislation."
It has also had its limits for the present Court, including Mr.
60. See Lerner, op. cit. supra, note 47, at 127-129.
61. Justices Black and Douglas, and Justice Murphy, say in their con-
curring opinions here that reluctance to strike down State regulation of
"conduct thought inimical to the public welfare" was the controlling influ-
ence which moved them to consent to the Gobitis decision. But the first two
add: "Long reflection has convinced us that although the principle is sound,
its application in the particular case was wrong."
62. See Lerner, op. cit. supra note 47, at 143 et seq. for the dissents and
a brilliant consideration of them.
63. As Mr. Justice Jackson said in this case, "Much of the vagueness of
the due process clause disappears when the specific prohibitions of the First
become its standard." It may be noted also that the prohibitions included
in the Fourteenth Amendment by virtue of the First are, unlike the prohibi-
tions of the Fourteenth, in terms against legislative abridgment ("Congress
shall make no law . . ."). It was from the legislature that the framers
most feared the danger, not from the executive or the courts.
64. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon (1922) 260 U. S. 393.
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Justice Frankfurter. The Court has recognized-even in deci-
sions which did not rely on the clear and present danger rule-
that, when an abridgment of freedom of speech or press is
claimed, not only is there no "deference" to be paid to the legis-
lative judgment, but that the Court "should be astute to examine
the effect of the challenged legislation." "Mere legislative prefer-
ence or beliefs," it has said often, may be insufficient to justify
abridgment of these rights, though ample to justify restriction
of others.65 In the Gobitis case, Mr. Justice Frankfurter urged
that this was valid only in the case of legislation cutting off ap-
propriate means through which "the processes of popular rule
may effectively function." 60 But six weeks before that decision,
in Thornhill v. Alaban=, and Carlson v. California,"8 he con-
curred in decisions making short work of legislation limiting
labor picketing. There was no deference to the legislatures there,
nor even the grace of apologetic reference to the earlier decisions
of the Court on which they must have relied. 9 Is it seriously
suggested that picketing is to be protected because it specially
influences legislation-or is it protected because, even though it
is more than utterance, it is still utterance?
CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER
In any event, a rigid bar to any theory of deference to the
legislature (and much more to the "reasonable doubt" doctrine
announced by Mr. Justice Frankfurter here6 ) is erected by the
clear and present danger test (for which Mr. Justice Holmes
was responsible), in the fields to which that applies.70 Mr. Justice
Frankfurter's minimizing of the test in 1941,71 as well as his
65. Schneider v. Irvington (1939) 308 U. S. 147, 161, quoted in many
later cases. See Hamilton and Braden, The Special Competence of the
Supreme Court (1941) 50 Yale L. J. 1319, 1349-1357; Lusky, Minority
Rights and the Public Interest (1942) 52 Yale L. J. 1, 11; Green, supra
note 1, 560-561, for this and for Mr. Chief Justice Stone's much broader
suggestion in United States v. Carolene Products Co. (1938) 304 U. S. 144,
152 n. 4. In the Gobitis case Mr. Justice Frankfurter distinguishes the
Schneider v. Irvington statement because of the "totally different order
of problem" with which the legislature was dealing;
66. Minersville School District v. Gobitis (1940) 310 U. S. 586, 599 n.
Mr. Chief Justice Stone answered him (at 605-607).
67. (1940) 310 U. S. 88.
68. (1940) 310 U. S. 106.
69. E.g. Truax v. Corrigan (1921) 257 U.S. 312, 340. See Teller,
Picketing and Free Speech (1942) 56 Harv. L. Rev. 180-181.
69a. See note 59, supra.
70. See Green, supra note 1, at 539 et seq.
71. In Bridges v. California (1941) 314 U. S. 252, 295-296.
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continued silence as to it earlier, was doubtless influenced by
this. The conflict between the two concepts in the Barnette case
is almost as sharp as it was eighteen years earlier in Gitlow v.
New York .7 1a Mr. Justice Frankfurter now urges that the clear
and present danger test is one of very limited application. It
is true that, while Justices Holmes and Brandeis said that it
applied "in every case," all of the cases in which they spoke
of clear and present danger were cases of political utterances
(by socialists, communists, synodicalists or pro-Germans). But,
commencing in 1940, the Court applied the rule, successively,
to picketing,72 to religious utterances 73 and to utterances pun-
ished as contempt of court.74 The delay of the Court in ex-
tending it to religious freedom was mentioned a year ago.
7 5
The District Court made that extension in the Barnette case ;76
and Mr. Justice Jackson, while striking down the flag salute
as an invasion of the freedom of silence rather than of religious
freedom, nevertheless included "freedom of worship" as one
of the rights which might be restricted "only to prevent grave
and immediate danger to interests which the State may law-
fully protect." While neither concurring opinion mentions the
rule-omissions which can hardly be inadvertent77-still three
justices at least appear to have supported Mr. Justice Jackson's
dictum. Even as a minority dictum, this is of great importance.
Aside from this, there was no development of the rule during
the term.78 There was no effort to apply it to any of the ordi-
nances relating to handbills or circulars, mentioned above; and
in Taylor v. Mississippi,7 the application was to the classic case
71a. (1925) 268 U. S. 652.
72. Thornhill v. Alabama (1940) 310 U. S. 88 and later cases.
78. Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940) 310 U. S. 296.
74. Bridges v. California (1941) 314 U. S. 252.
75. Green, supra note 1, at 523, 560.
76. See note 52, supra.
77. Clear and present danger was not mentioned in the brief of the
Bill of Rights Committee of the American Bar Association; but it was
urged by counsel for appellees, who, in the oral argument, said that the
only clear and present danger resulting from refusal to salute the flag
was the clear and present danger that the person so refusing would be
mauled or killed. 11 U. S. Law Week 3279.
78. Perhaps there should be mentioned the Court's surprising resort to
clear and present danger, in construing the naturalization statute of 1906,
in Schneiderman v. United States (1943) 63 S. Ct. 1333, 87 L. ed. 1249.
79. (1948) 63 S. Ct. 1200, 87 L. ed. 1195. The authorities cited by Mr.
Justice Roberts here were DeJonge v. Oregon (1937) 299 U. S. 353 and
Herndon v. Lowry (1937) 301 U. S. 242. The persistence of old standards
was shown by the fact that Mississippi enacted a "reasonable tendency"
statute-in 1942!
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of political utterances. The silence of Mr. Chief Justice Stone
with respect to clear and present danger remained unbroken.
RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
At the 1941 term the Court, after six years of developing the
rule that the State's use of confessions made by an accused under
certain conditions" violated the due process clause, had brought
this to a point where it seemed not far removed from the privi-
lege against self-incrimination which the Fifth Amendment guar-
antees.8 1 The rule appears to be in no degree qualified by the
"fair trial rule" mentioned below. At the term just closed the
Court dealt with no cases involving this rule; it mentioned it in
McNabb v. United States,82 but in restricted terms.
In Betts v. Brady,8 3 toward the end of the 1941 term, the
Court (a 6 to 3 majority) affirmed the conviction by a Maryland
court of an uneducated and penniless farm hand. Accused of
robbery, he had asked the trial court to appoint counsel for him.
The court refusing, he defended himself as best he could, was
(not surprisingly) convicted, and was sentenced to eight years
in prison. Ten years earlier, in Powell v. Alabama,84 the Court,
influenced by the inclusion of freedom of speech and press in
the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, had held
that the right to the aid of counsel, guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment, was likewise within the protection of the due proc-
ess clause, 85 and had reversed the convictions of the Scottsboro
negroes for rape. But the Court now held that the due process
clause did not protect the right to the appointment of counsel
80. For the latest and broadest catalog of these conditions, see Ward v.
Texas (1942) 316 U. S. 547.
81. Cf. Mr. Justice Roberts in Lisenba v. California (1941) 62 S. Ct.
280, 290: "The concept of due process would void a trial in which, by
threat or promises . . . a defendant was induced to testify against him-
self." See Green, supra note 1, at 530-531.
82. (1943) 87 L. ed. 579, 584. For a case (remanded because habeas
corpus was available) in the related field of convictions based upon per-jured testimony, see Pyle v. Kansas (1942) 63 S. Ct. 177, 87 L. ed. 154.
83. (1942) 316 U. S. 455.
84. (1932) 287 U. S. 45.
85. There was qualifying language in the opinion, but the Court itself
regarded this as the holding. In Grosjean v. American Press Co. (1936)
297 U. S. 233, 243, the Court said: " * * * in Powell v. Alabama .. . we
concluded that certain fundamental rights, safeguarded by the first eight
amendments against federal action, were also safeguarded against state
action by the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and
among them the fundamental right of the accused to the aid of counsel in a
criminal prosecution." See also Palko v. Connecticut (1937) 302 U. S. 319,
324, where the Court referred to "the right of one accused of crime to the
benefit of counsel" as "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."
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except when, in a particular case, a fair trial could not be had
without it, that this right was not "a fundamental right, essen-
tial to a fair trial."8
The "fair trial rule" was not only valid but necessary in the
cases to which the Court had first applied it-that is, to a trial
which though superficially conforming to due process, was simply
a "mask" for a conviction due to mob influence, to public pas-
sion, or to perjured testimony. 7 The rule was used to add some-
thing to the Bill of Rights, to ensure that the rights there guar-
anteed were accorded in fact, not simply in form. But at the
1941 term the rule, with its concomitant "independent examina-
tion of the record," had been so far extended that it seemed to
have become most dangerous.88 Its use in Betts v. Brady to
sabotage a "fundamental" right which the Court had already
declared to be within the shelter of the Fourteenth Amendment
was a perversion of its original spirit which seems dangerous in
the extreme, for this may well be only the first instance of such
use to prevent inclusion in the Fourteenth Amendment of the
precise and inflexible rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.89
In contrast with the previous year, at the 1942 term the Court
dealt with the fair trial rule only once. In Buchalter v. New
York 9- Mr. Justice Roberts stated it in general terms, but found
no circumstances to which it applied. 91 No case approaching the
ultimate issue in Betts v. Brady was decided.92 That remains the
unfinished business of the Court.
86. See Green, supra note 1, at 530.
87. See Moore v. Dempsey (1923) 261 U. S. 86. For an earlier applica-
tion of the rule, see Mr. Justice Holmes' dissenting opinion in Frank v.
Mangum (1915) 237 U. S. 309, 345.
88. See Green, supra note 1, at 534 n.
89. For other criticism of Betts v. Brady, see Lusky, supra note 65, at
28-40; Griswold and Cohen (1942) N. Y. Times, Aug. 2, 1942, p. E6, col. 5;
Note (1942) 21 Chicago-Kent L. Rev. 107; Note (1942) 42 Col. L. Rev.
1205; Note (1943) 11 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 254; Note (1942) 31 In. Bar J.
189; Note (1942) 27 Marquette L. Rev. 34; Note (1934) 16 So. Cal. L.
Rev. 55; Note (1942) 91 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 78; Note (1943) Wisc. L. Rev.
118, 123. For a more favorable view, see Haight, "Betts v. Brady" (1943)
29 Am. Bar Assn. Journal 61.
90. (1943) 63 S. Ct. 429, 87 L. ed. 1088.
91. Mr. Justice Black, who wrote the dissenting opinion in Betts v.
Brady, agreed only "substantially," making no mention of the rule.
92. A brief reference to the decision appears in Mr. Justice Frankfurter's
opinion in Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann (1943) 63 S. Ct. 236,
87 L. ed. 209. More enlightening is Mitchell v. Youell (1942) 130 F. (2d)
880, where the Circuit Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit, in a careful
opinion by Circuit Judge Parker, held that the refusal to appoint counsel
in a Virginia prosecution for burglary deprived the accused of a fair trial.,
reversing the conviction notwithstanding Betts v. Brady.
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